John Dunn recently reminds us of an essential point made by Moses Finley decades ago: Western philosophy emerged in hostile response to democratic politics and society. Dunn and Finley highlight the enormous overlap between the oligarchic and philosophic critiques of Athens, an overlap best exemplified by Plato’s and, to a lesser extent, Aristotle’s writings. (lk 143)
Mina pakuks vaidlusele, kas Platon on totalitaristlik järgmise kompromissi. Nimelt, küsimus pole mitte üksikus filosoofis, vaid asjaolus, et filosoofia ja demokraatia ei käi hästi kokku. Filosoofia on julgelt ja suurelt eksimise kunst. Seal, kus demokraatia parandab püsivalt iseennast läbi masside osaluse ja võimu jaotumise filosoofia võtab ette aina suuremaid eksimusi.
The writings of Italian authors associated more directly with “republicanism” as such are just antidemocratic and oligarhically inclined, and can also be situated in close proximity to subversions or usurpations of popular governments: I refer specifically here to the philosopher-statesmen Marcus Tullius, Cicero, Leonardo Bruni, and Francesco Guicciardini. (lk 143)
Vabariikluse maine on nii kehv, et isegi diktaatorid ei taha oma riikidele “vabariik” nimeks panna (alati on mingi “demokraatlik…”), sest annaks äkki ära, mis värk on.
[…] Roman citizen-soldiers were gradually forced into worsening poverty as senators and their clients refused to share public lands with them; in fact, they even refused to employ poor citizens to work such lands, opting to hire much cheaper slave labor instead. The more the people clamored for land redistribution, the more the senate advocated the conquest of ever more distant lands. They did so hoping to acquire territory that only nobles, and not plebeians, could afford to make profitable. As a result of such policies, citizen-soldiers began to live for ever-longer periods of time with their commanders away from Rome, and thus became economically dependent on their generals, individuals to whom, instead of the republic, they now pledged their loyalty. (lk 143)
Siinkohal tuleb ära mainida ka, et autor ei süüdista Cicerot teadlikus pleebe jõustavate institutsioonide hävitamises, vaid sarnaselt Machiavellile üritab näidata, kuidas väheste huvid ei ole riigi huvid ja Cicerole surmaga lõppev kodusõdade kurss on juhuslikult kokkulangev aristokraatlik-vabariikliku usuga „parimate meeste“ valitsemisse, kuid samas mitte ka niiväga juhuslikult, arvestades, et väheste ja paljude huvid kipuvad alatasa omavahel konfliktis olema.
[…] Bruni, whom Hans Baron famously identified as the founder of Florentine civic republicanism, served as intellectual spokesman for the oligarchy replaced generations of popular rule exercised through guild corporatism in the Florentine Republic. Bruni celebrated, in classical philosophical terms, practices of popular “participation” that, in fact, had been quite recently denuded of any significance by the oligarchy headed by the Albizzi family. (lk 143-144)
Leonardo Bruni on kolmeosalise ajaloo kontseptsiooni algataja ja mind väga häirib, et ma tean tema seda punases hõlstis portreed, aga ma ei tea kuskohast või miks. Vabalt võib olla ükstapuha milline ajalooraamatu kaas. See konflikt tundub rohkem filosoofilise kui poliitilise iseloomuga. Natuke ehk liiga palju omistades võib väita, et klassikaline vabariiklus koos oma positiivsete vabaduste ja kohustustega omistab inimelule eesmärgi tema eest ja on seeläbi võimeline inimesi ka väärtuslikemaks või vähem väärtuslikemaks liigitama. Tänapäevane liberalism mõistab vabadust negatiivsetes terminites. See küsimus kuivõrd saavad poliitikud aru, et osalus, mida nad pakuvad on tähendusetu, ei jaotu sellel skaalal väga hästi. Küll aga siit raamatust võiks kaasa võtta mõttetera, et kui osalemine poliitikas on tagajärjetu, st pole päris, siis rahva arvamus kipub olema märkimisväärselt radikaalsem, kui juhul kui osalemisel on reaalsed poliitilised tagajärjed. Seega, võlts osalus poliitikas on alati hea viis kuidas klassikalise vabariikluse elitaarsust õigustada, sest kui rahva arvamusest midagi ei sõltu, siis arvavad nad üpris debiilseid asju.
[…] Guicciardini crystallized the aspirations of wealthy and notable citizens within republics and served as a crucial if unrecognized conduit between the republicanisms of Cicero and James Madison. After the Medici’s expulsion in 1494, Florence reinstated popular government: a governo largo characterized by a large, Athenian-style citizen assembly and, eventually, by magistrate appointment procedures that mixed lottery and election. In protest, Guicciardini proposed simple election as the proper mode of appointing magistrates and the establishment of a senate, where policy would be more substantively discussed and better decided than in the Great Council. (lk 144)
Guicciardini Wikipedia andmetel ka historiograafias selle poolest tuntud, et kasutas valitsuste dokumente allikatena. Ta oli see tüüp, kes Machiavellit elus hoiab nagu ma aru saan, arvestades, et Guicciardini sõbrad üpriski julgelt vabariigi kukutavad ja Machiavelli rolli küsitavaks muudavad. Seetõttu tundub, et siin on ka omajagu annus poliitilist realismi. Kui mõni gild või perekond on piisavalt võimukas, et edukas riigipööre korraldada ja ükstapuha kes pukki panna, siis miks ei peakski süsteem nende soovidele vastu tulema?
Following Quentin Skinner in certain important respects here, Pettit credits Machiavelli alongside Cicero, Harrington, Sydney, and Montesquieu as an author who does not embrace a “positive concept of liberty,” who does not associate freedom with “a self-determining democracy,” and who does not, first and foremost, prioritize “participation.” (lk 146)
Aiman vastuväiteid tulemas.
It might be said that Machiavelli’s theory legitimizes the people’s “natural” disposition of passivity while also justifying an “unnatural” or learned active political posture. Conversely, Machiavelli’s assertion that the elites’ appetite to dominate is insatiable, whether or not this can be demonstrated in every case, necessitates the extra-electoral safeguards against them, such as the class-specific offices and popularly judged political trials that I discussed in previous chapters, as well participation that is not only active but also antagonistic. (lk 146)
Kõike, mida lihtrahvas teeb peab kuidagi põhjendama ja põhjenduseks on rahva soov mitte olla… sõna „dominate“ võib tõlkida ka lihtsalt kui „valitsema“. Rahvas ei soovi, et teda valitsetakse. Semantilised pisiasjad. See on küll oluline on see, et rahvas vajab tegelikult motiveerivat põhjendust valitsemisest osa võtmiseks. Vabatahtlik kodanikuühiskond nagu tänapäeval tavaks, on ülimalt ebaefektiivne.
Pettit observes that „the worst hit,“ if armed with a veto when confronted with onerous but socially necessary policy proposals, “would be likely to block the initiative in the hope of inducing others to bear the costs.” In such circumstances, society as a whole would never benefit from advantages to be gained by, say, progressive tax arrangements, power plants, antipollution legislation, or needle exchange programs. (lk 151)
Parempoolse poliitika igapäevane reaalsus.
Furthermore, are countermajoritarian institutions more likely to serve the interests of privileged, well-resourced, and already insulated minorities rather than those of genuinely vulnerable minorities? The record of such institutions actually protecting the vulnerable minorities is, after all, decidedly mixed. (lk 153)
Spetsiifliselt vähemusi kaitsevad institutsioonid tekitavad
priviligeeritud ja haavatavad vähemused või eksisteerib see jaotus juba varem?
Pettit’s extra-electoral, contestatory institutions function much more like the countermajoritarian ones typifying liberal constitutionalism – namely, upper legislative chambers and supreme courts – than they do popularly contestatory ones such as the Roman tribunate or the guild-specific, lottery-based practices characterizing Florentine politics. After all, elite-dominated, countermajoritarian institutions such as upper houses and supreme courts, despite being charged with the protections of minorities, nevertheless have proven notoriously susceptible to capture by or collusion with entrenched, highly resourced interest groups. (lk 155)
USA suunas üks kuri lõik.
Pettit worries that when the people confront issues such as sentencing or prostitution, rather than “consider the overall consequences of each arrangement and make a rational choice,” they instead take an unreflective “moral stand” and encourage their representatives, via the threat of punitive electoral sanction, to make bad policy. Pettit speculates that, in such circumstances, voters may use the ballot “primarily as a way of expressing their personal, often heartfelt stand on some issue of moral or religious significance”; to his mind, they are likely to “use their vote for the pleasure of expressive satisfaction.” (lk 156)
Siin on nii ilmselge ka asjaolu, et valitud esindajad teevad täpselt seda sama – eeldavad, mida valija neilt ootab ning võtavad vastu moraaliseerivaid ja rumalaid poliitikaid. Pettit’ poolt lahenduseks pakutav depolitiseerimine on ilmselt antidemokraatliku liikumise alge.
Pettit himself flirts with a creeping expansion of policy spheres that are largely insulated from popular judgement when, in another instance, he identifies public prosecution as a task that ought to be depoliticized. This is, I remind readers, one of the primary spheres over which Machiavelli assigns the people ultimate judgement (D I.7-8) (lk 157)
Varasemast on mul jäänud mulje, et Machiavelli räägib spetsiifiliselt poliitilise loomuga süüdistustest.
While Pettit […] sometimes gestures to the notion that elite prerogative is the greatest threat posed by contemporary democracy, he usually writes, especially when prescribing institutional reforms, as though majority tyranny is clearly the maximum political danger. (lk 158)
20. sajand oli ka väga selgelt omaette ajastu, kus „rahvas“ ja „enamus“ ei tähendanud enam seda, mida nad peaksid tähendama, vaid muutusid poliitilise sisuga mõisteteks, mille tähendusega üritati mängida. Seega, „enamuse türanniat“ võib mõista ka kui lihtsalt ideoloogilist kalduvust habeme ja vuntsidega ideolooge järgida. Võimalik, et see on ka kirjanduslik võte. Selleks, et raamatut poliitikast lugeda peab lugeja kaasa saama uskumuse, et ta on nüüd targem kui „rumalad“ ja „märatsevad“ massid. Preservatiividele apelleerimiseks peab sellist värki tegema. Nägin kusagil uuringut, et liberaalid vaatavad verd, õnnetusi ja katastroofe pikemalt ja preservatiivid vaatavad inimesi, kes selliseid asju vaatavad rohkem. „Rumala massi“ demonstreerimine on preservatiividele erilisuse tunde tekitamiseks valitud kunstiline vahend.
Ultimately, what exactly will keep expert commissioners sufficiently depoliticized, impartial, and attentive to the common good? Pettit’s answer is deeply Ciceronian: such commissioners wish to enhance “their reputation,” and to satisfy their “desire for esteem.”
Oh, for fuck’s sake!
Perhaps Pettit has good cause to be suspicious of opinions that average people express in conventional polls with no legally binding consequence. He draws on evidence suggesting that, when questioned for such polls, people very often express “frustration or exasperation or malice or something of the kind,” since, in such context, they know that they are not responsible for their opinions. (lk 160)
See vajab aeg-ajalt meelde tuletamist.
[…] Machiavelli thought that people collectively should guard against false negatives (i.e., ensure that government policies accurately reflect common avowable interests) by exercising legislative judgement themselves and that they should guard against false positives (i.e., object to government policies that adversely affect common interests) by directly exercising judicial authority and by quasi-directly exercising contestations through the tribunician veto. (lk 164)
Lihtsalt pani mõtlema kuivõrd see valeposiitivne/-negatiivne
siin mõistmisel abiks on. Pean seedima seda veel hetke või paar.
[…] they [Cambridge scholars] neglect the fact that, in both practice and theory, republicanism has legitimated considerable arbitrary intervention by socioeconomic elites into the lives of ordinary citizens. (lk 166)
Julged süüdistused.
[…] I emphasize three important elements common to the republicanisms of Pettit, Cicero, Bruni, and Guicciardini: (1) each marginalizes or constrains the place of popular participation within the politics of republics; (2) each isolates general election as the principal means of appointing magistrates (that is, they reject or eschew alternatives involving lottery, an election-lottery mixture, class or occupational quotas for offices, etc.); and (3) each confers on a rather senatorial set of elites wide deliberative and decisional prerogative over policy questions concerning the common good, without formulating any clear criteria by which one could ascertain the appropriate limits to be placed upon elite judgement. (167-168)
Mul on halb harjumus igasugu asju õigustada, aga see kõik kõlab nagu esindusdemokraatia. Kas ei seisne nimetatud autorite aupositsioon just selles, et nad on meie maailmakorda pisut ennetanud? See, kuivõrd nad demokraatia vaenlased olid, pole niiväga teema.
[…] lotteries keep socioeconomic elites from monopolizing public offices, and elections supposedly sanction political elites retrospectively. (lk 173)
Üks neist asjadest on tänapäeva demokraatiatest enamasti puudu.
Political philosophers from Aristotle to Machiavelli assumed, and the many republics they analyzed confirmed, that the primary conflicts within republics would ensue between wealthy and less wealthy citizens. Why then did late- and post-eighteenth-century republicans abandon conceptual and institutional class-specificity while drafting their constitutions? When not in the excessively ochlophobic state of mind mentioned before, perhaps many were heartened by what seemed to be a dawning “pluralist” commercial age when a wide spectrum of social groups, relatively equal in power and influence, might supplant the rich/poor citizen cleavage that prevailed in the republics of previous ages. (lk 179)
Läänemaailma vabariiklus pole ehitatud just väga kindlale alusvundamendile.
Canada, Brazil, Denmark, and even China, among others, have empowered various „minipopuluses“ to participate directly in constitutional politics by, for instance, drafting electoral reform proposals, and such countries have voluntarily adopted the policy recommendations of these citizen assemblies on issues such as energy conservation and irradiated foods. (lk 182)
See on hea koht, kus lõpetada.
